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Agenda
• What is information security?
• Technical building blocks
• Risk management cycle
• Return on Security Investment
• Architecture for Collecting
quantitative historical data
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What is information security?
• Communication networks
– a lot of users
– quite a lot of
operators
Unauthorized acquisition of information
Unauthorized modification of information
Unauthorized impairment of functionality
Threats
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Protection goals
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Typical attack sequence
1. Gaining information
– IP addresses, passwords,
entry points
2. Attack (mostly via the Internet)
– exploits, weak protocols,
misuse of data/passwords etc.
3. Extension of access privileges
– particularly installation of a
back door
4. remove traces
– delete or manipulate log files
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Protection goals
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Protection Goals
Confidentiality
Integrity
Availability
Subject of communication
WHAT?
Circumstances of communication
WHEN?, WHERE?, WHO?
Anonymity
Unobservability
Accountability
Legal Enforcement
Contents Sender
Recipient
Location
Billing
Contents
Sender
Recipient
Hiding
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Types of attacks
Confidentiality
Availability
Integrity
• Passive attacks
– eavesdropping
– traffic analysis
• Active attacks
– masquerading
• man-in-the-middle attack
– modification of data
– injection of data
• replay
• flooding, spamming
– denial of service
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Technical building blocks
Confidentiality
Hiding
Integrity
Accountability
Legal Enforcement
Anonymity
Unobservability
Availability
• Symmetric Encryption:
– one key, two copies
• Asymmetric Encryption: two keys
– public key: everybody knows it
– private key: known by recipient
• Steganography:
– hiding the existence of content
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Technical building blocks
Confidentiality
Hiding
Integrity
Accountability
Legal Enforcement
Anonymity
Unobservability
Availability
• Symmetric Encryption:
– one key, two copies
• Asymmetric Encryption: two keys
– public key: everybody knows it
– private key: known by recipient
• Steganography:
– hiding the existence of content
Encryption and Steganography
– Fast, secure and cheap!
PGP.com
GnuPG.org
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Technical building blocks
Confidentiality
Hiding
Integrity
Accountability
Legal Enforcement
Anonymity
Unobservability
Availability
• Message Authentication Codes
– based on symmetric encryption
– protects from modification by external
attacks
– fast, secure and cheap
• Digital signatures
– based on asymmetric encryption
– two keys
• public key: everybody knows it
• private key: known by recipient
– private key used to sign a document
– public key used to verify
– allows legal accountability and
enforcement (similar to contract signing
in the real world)
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• only the sender can
generate a signed message
secret area of sender
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Technical building blocks
Confidentiality
Hiding
Integrity
Accountability
Legal Enforcement
Anonymity
Unobservability
Availability
• Digital signatures
– based on asymmetric encryption
– two keys
• public key: everybody knows it
• private key: known by recipient
– private key used to sign a document
– public key used to verify
– allows legal accountability and
enforcement (similar to contract signing
in the real world)
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Technical building blocks
Confidentiality
Hiding
Integrity
Accountability
Legal Enforcement
Anonymity
Unobservability
Availability
• Digital signatures in the real world are
– Fast, secure, but:
• Expensive!
• Digital signatures
– based on asymmetric encryption
– two keys
• public key: everybody knows it
• private key: known by recipient
– private key used to sign a document
– public key used to verify
– allows legal accountability and
enforcement (similar to contract signing
in the real world)
More exactly:
  Tech. cheap 
  Orga. expensive
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Technical building blocks
Confidentiality
Hiding
Integrity
Accountability
Legal Enforcement
Anonymity
Unobservability
Availability
• Public key infrastructure (expensive)
– authenticity of public keys has to be
ensured by technical (cheap) and
organizational (expensive) means:
• digital key certificates (e.g. X.509)
• Certification authority has to
– check physical identification documents
– process is handled by paper (legal
issues)
– for every user, year after year
• Costs (for handling paperwork and the
physical process)
– 10 - 150 EUR per certificate p.a.
• 80 Mill. Germans: > 1 billion EUR
– Who should pay for the security?
        The signer         The recipient
Management of Information Security
20
Prof. Dr Hannes Federrath
Technical building blocks
Confidentiality
Hiding
Integrity
Accountability
Legal Enforcement
Anonymity
Unobservability
Availability
• Protection of privacy
– Anonymity: Protection of the identity of
a user while using a service (e.g.
counseling services)
– Unobservability: Protection of the
communication relations of users
• Internationally agreed privacy principles
(e.g. EU Privacy Directive of 1995)
– no covert collections of personal
information
– informed consent to purpose prior to
collection
– retention and use only according to
agreed purpose
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Technical building blocks
Confidentiality
Hiding
Integrity
Accountability
Legal Enforcement
Anonymity
Unobservability
Availability
• Reality:
– organizations ignore privacy
– international
• Privacy activists
– develop anonymization tools
• http://tor.eff.org
• http://www.anon-online.org
• To respect the privacy laws is
1. a matter of legal compliance,
2. a marketing issue (acceptance of privacy
friendly systems) and
3. cheap!
No storage of personal data, no
effort for privacy protection.
Management of Information Security
22
Prof. Dr Hannes Federrath
Technical building blocks
Confidentiality
Hiding
Integrity
Accountability
Legal Enforcement
Anonymity
Unobservability
Availability
• Availability:
– ensures that data and services are
accessible to the user within a certain
period of time
• Two Mechanisms:
– Redundancy: duplication of components
or repetition of operations to provide
alternative functional channels in case of
failure
– Diversity: functional identical channels
with a variety of designs provide reliable
functionality in case of (software) failure
• Redundancy and diversity:
– Expensive
Risk management
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Identification
Control
Assessment
Monitoring
Checklists
Workshops
Histor. data
Experts
Baseline
Qualitative
Quantitative
Best Practice
Scoring
Quant.
Methods
Checklists
Scorecards
Business
Ratios
Security
management
is a risk
management
task
Risk management cycle
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Identification of threats
• Question
– »What are the threats?«
• Methods & Tools
– checklists
– workshops
– attack trees
– fault trees
• Challenge
– cover all threats
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Assessment of threats
• Question
– »What are the probabilities and
consequences of threats?«
– Risk = probability * consequence
• Methods & Tools
– qualitative assessment
– quantitative assessment
– game theory
• Challenges
– dependency from assets
– strategic attackers
– correlations between threats
– source of (quantitative) input
low med high
low
med
high
Probability of damage
C
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Risik
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Control of threats
• Question
– »How to handle risks?«
• Methods
– best practice approaches
– baseline protection
Risik assessment
Entire risk Risik avoidance
Protection measures
Damage limitation
Shifting
Security architecture
Emergency
plan
Insurances
according to: Schaumüller-Bichl
Residual risk
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Monitoring of risks and measures
• Questions
– »Were the measures effective and efficient?«
»What is the current protection level?«
• Method
– scorecard approaches
according to: Loomans, 2002
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Identification
Control
Assessment
Monitoring
Checklists
Workshops
Histor. data
Experts
Baseline
Qualitative
Quantitative
Best Practice
Scoring
Quant.
Methods
Checklists
Scorecards
Business
Ratios
Quantitative
security
management
needs
quantitative
data
Risk management cycle
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Return on Security Investment (ROSI)
• based on the calculation of an annual loss expectancy for a certain
undesirable event (threat): (FIBS 1979)
• aggregation of ALEs of several events:
(Soo Hoo 2000)
• Return on security investment: (Wei et. al 2001)
• if ROSI >0 then investment was advantageous
ALE0-ALE1: change of the
ALE from year 0 to year 1
Cost: cost of the security
measure
! 
ALE = SLE " ARO
Oi: harmful outcome i
S(Oi): Severity of Oi (in
monetary units)
ALE: annual loss expectancy
SLE: single loss expectancy
ARO: annual rate of
occurrence
! 
ALE = S(O
i
)F
i
i =1
n
"
! 
ROSI = ALE
0
" ALE
1
" cost
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• ROSI
– Alternative calculation as a ratio: (Sonnenreich et. al. 2006)
– Another variation: (Pfleeger and Pfleeger 2003)
• Advantages
– Different security measures can now be compared.
– Security investments can now be compared with other
investments (non-security).
difference of risk exposure
before and after reduction in
relation to the costs of the
measure
! 
ROSI =
(risk exposure "% risk mitigated) # cost
cost
! 
risk leverage =
(risk exp. before red.)" (risk exp. after red.)
cost of risk reduction
Return on Security Investment (ROSI)
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cost
benefit
do something
= nothing happens
cost
benefit
do the right
= nothing happens
Detailed information
(numbers) on past events
cost-
benefit
analysis
Some information from the
past
...
Quantitative data is needed
• Risk assessment needs input:
– probability of a security-related event and
– level of damage (cost in case of …)
• Problem:
– enterprises are not willing to reveal such information
– loss of reputation/trust
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Potential Sources for Quantitative Data
Not applicable to all
situations
Not yet available
Capital market analyses
Exploit derivatives
Bug challenges
Market Mechanisms
Widely used in other
areas (e.g. insurances)
Past != Future
Hardly available so far
Good, however reliable
input data is needed
Used frequently, but
not originally
quantitative
Subjective, incomplete
Evaluation
CERTS collect data on
security events
Internal incident
reporting
Historical Data
Historical simulations
Monte carlo simulations
Simulations
Interviews with internal
or external experts
CSI/FBI Survey
Expert Judgements
ExampleMechanism
Management of Information Security
33
Prof. Dr Hannes Federrath
Idea: Collecting quantitative historical data
• Idea
– Building a system for the collection of quantitative historical data
on security incidents from different organizations
• Goal
– A database that gives information about impact and frequency of
security incidents
• Existing approaches have a different focus
• Microeconomic theory shows the utility of that concept
• Various possibilities to use that data
– Risk assessment, investment decisions
– Benchmarking between organizations
– Examination of statistical distribution functions, correlations
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External
Sources
CERTs
Honeynets
Experts
Surveys
Platform
Provider
Participant A
Participant B
Participant C
Incident
Data
Aggreg.
Data
Additional
Data
Basic Architecture
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Incident
Description
Incident
Effects
Incident
Handling
Organizational
Setting
Reports
Risk
Parameters
Input and Output
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Fairness Requirements
• Two major problems known from economics
– Free-riding
– Truth-telling
• Mechanisms
– Incentive system
– Reputation system
– Legal framework
– Statistical checks for plausibility
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Current State of Implementation
• Web-based multi-tier Application
– Java Servlets, JavaServer Pages PostgreSQL
• Taxonomy realized as XML-schema
– All incident reports in XML
• Already implemented
– Data collection/transfer
– Data storage
• Next steps
– Data analysis mechanisms
– Interface for ext. data
– Deciding on mechanisms
to provide fairness
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Conclusions
• Security management becomes more challenging
– Increasing dependence on information systems
– Growing number of threats
– Compliance requirements
• Security management is a risk management task
– Measuring costs and benefits of security is challenging
– Quantitative data is needed for modern security management
– Historical data might be a solution for that problem
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